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Resolving Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane
ELLEN E. BosHKoFF*
INTRODUCTION
For several years the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of when
criminal defendants should be given the benefit of rules of criminal proce-
dure which were established after their trials.' The Court started this debate
in Linkletter v. Walker by declining to apply the exclusionary rule of Mapp
v. Ohio3 retroactively to cases on habeas corpus review. 4 Finding that "the
Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect,' the Link-
letter Court held that "though [a Mapp violation] might be fundamental it
is not of the nature requiring us to overturn all final convictions based
upon it. ' '6
Following the Linkletter decision, a divided Court struggled with retro-
activity analysis and produced a series of controversial decisions.7 The Court
discarded the distinction between direct and collateral appeals8 and for a
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1983,
Swarthmore College.
1. Whenever the Supreme Court "lays down a new constitutional procedural rule that
overrules or substantially departs from prior precedent" the issue of who receives the benefit
of that rule arises. Note, United States v. Johnson: Reformulating the Retroactivity Doctrine,
69 CORNELL L. REv. 166, 167 (1983). A rule is fully retroactive when it is available to all
litigants, regardless of whether their cases have already been adjudicated. Id.
2. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Prior to this case all new rules of criminal procedure were applied
retroactively. Id. at 628 & n. 13 ("It is true that heretofore, without discussion, we have applied
new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the promulgation of the rule."). However,
previous civil rulings had been prospectively applied. Id. at 624-29. The Court used these to
support its decision. Id. at 628-29. For a discussion of why Linkletter "misused" this precedent,
see Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court Retroactivity Analysis: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal Habeas Corpus, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1062,
1064-68 (1985).
3. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp Court held that states are required to exclude evidence
from trials that was seized in violation of the search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment. This overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), where the Court had held
that although the fourth amendment was applicable to the states, the exclusionary rule was
not the required remedy for violations.
4. The new rule had already been applied retroactively to cases on direct review. Linkletter,
381 U.S. at 622.
5. Id. at 629.
6. Id. at 639-40.
7. For a history of this period, see Case Note, Retroactive Application of Constitutional
Rules Regarding Criminal Procedure: Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987), 56 U. CN.
L. REv. 1097, 1099-1107 (1988).
8. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967). The Court reestablished the distinction in
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
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period of years applied a three part balancing test implied by Linkletter.9
During this time Justice Harlan emerged as one of the strongest critics of
the Linkletter test. In several dissenting opinions he argued for a new
standard which used the procedural distinctions among defendants as the
primary means for determining retroactivity. 10
In 1987, the Supreme Court partially overruled Linkletter and applied
Harlan's retroactivity analysis to defendants on direct review." Following
that decision the treatment of habeas defendants remained uncertain.' 2
However, last term the Court completed the recent overhaul of retroactivity
analysis. In Teague v. Lane'" a plurality of the Court extended a modified
form of the Harlan approach to all retroactivity cases.' 4 A few weeks later
in Penry v. Lynaugh 5 the Court extended the new retroactivity analysis to
habeas death penalty cases.
9. Under this test, courts considered three factors: (1) the new rule's purpose and whether
that purpose would be advanced by retroactive application of the rule; (2) the extent of reliance
on old precedent; and (3) the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice. Stovall,
388 U.S. at 293. For cases that provide extensive discussion of this test, see e.g., Brown v.
Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (ruling that prohibits conviction by non-unanimous six person
jury should be applied retroactively); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (ruling that
exclusion of women from a jury violates the sixth and fourteenth amendments will not be
applied retroactively); Adams v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 278 (1972) (decision that preliminary hearing
is critical stage of prosecution requiring presence of counsel will not be applied retroactively).
10. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-81 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also United States
v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 n.13 (1970); Jenkins v. Delaware, 395
U.S. 213, 222-24 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (applying Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986)).
12. In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), which was handed down a few months before
Griffith, the Court used the Linkletter test to decide against applying Batson retroactively to
habeas cases. However, in Griffith, the Court held that Batson would be applied retroactively
to cases on direct review. In reaching this result the Court did not justify, or discuss, the
distinction between defendants on direct and collateral review. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 332 n.l
(White, J., dissenting). Therefore, it was unclear whether the Griffith holding had any
ramifications for habeas defendants. Comment, Griffith v. Kentucky: Partial Adoption of
Justice Harlan's Retroactivity Standard, 10 CpAm. JusT. J. 153, 165-66 (1987). Justice Powell,
concurring in Griffith, noted that the treatment of habeas defendants was uncertain: "[I]t was
not necessary for the Court to express an opinion with respect to habeas corpus petitions. As
I read the Court's opinion, this question is carefully left open until it is squarely presented."
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring).
13. 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
14. Although Justice White concurred in the result, he indicated that he basically agreed
with the retroactivity rule created by Teague:
I regret the course the Court has taken to this point, but ... I have insufficient
reason to continue to object .... [T]he result reached in Parts IV and V of
Justice O'Connor's opinion is an acceptable application in collateral proceedings
of the theories embraced by the Court in cases dealing with direct review, and I
concur in that result.
Id. at 1079 (White, J., concurring in result).
15. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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These three recent cases appear to end the debate that has raged for years
over retroactivity. However, difficult problems remain. The Penry Court
was sharply divided, with four dissenters arguing that the majority had
misapplied the retroactivity test which had been created only weeks earlier
in Teague. 6 In addition, lower courts have had difficulty applying the
principles established by Teague and Penry.17 Thus, although the Court
abandoned the flexible Linkletter balancing test partially to attain greater
certainty and consistency in retroactivity analysis, 8 that goal has not yet
been achieved. The Court will have to revisit this thorny issue to clarify
application of its new rules.
In this Note I argue that the Court should not attempt to use categorical
rules to resolve the retroactivity problem in habeas corpus cases. To support
this argument, in Part I, I discuss the Court's newest retroactivity test. In
Part II, I compare the Teague approach with the earlier Linkletter balancing
test and identify a flaw common to the two approaches. I argue that like
Linkletter, the Teague retroactivity test fails to provide a mechanism for
judges to accommodate concerns about inaccurate convictions in individual
cases. I close in Part III by proposing a new exception to the Teague
retroactivity test. Under my proposed approach, retroactivity is determined
largely on an individual, rather than categorical, basis.
I. THE NEw TEST
The Court's new retroactivity test is based on the analysis contained in
Justice Harlan's dissents from the Linkletter era. 9 For purposes of retro-
activity, Justice Harlan drew a sharp dividing line between direct and
collateral review. 20 He believed that the Court should apply all new rules
16. Id. at 2964-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "It is rare that a principle of law as significant
as that in Teague is adopted and gutted in the same Term." Id. at 2965.
17. See, e.g., Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1989) (decided on grounds of abuse
of the writ, however four different concurring or dissenting opinions were filed by judges
disagreeing about retroactivity principles); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir.
1989); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Sawyer v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 835 (1990).
18. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070 ("The Linkletter retroactivity standard has not led to
consistent results.").
19. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675-81 (1971). (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan initially supported
applying the balancing test created by Linkletter as a vehicle to "limit the impact of
constitutional decisions which seemed to [him] profoundly unsound in principle." Id. at 258.
Four years after Linkletter, disillusioned with the "extraordinary collection of rules" that
Linkletter had spawned, Harlan proposed the alternative retroactivity standard contained in
these dissents.
20. Justice Harlan noted that a case is on collateral review when the prisoner has filed a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or a motion to vacate a judgment under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 in federal court. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 681 n.l. The Supreme Court's current
definition is essentially identical. See note 29.
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of criminal procedure retroactively to cases on direct review. 2' This followed
from his conviction that the function of judicial review is to decide cases
and apply the Constitution as "one source of the matrix of governing legal
rules."'22 Harlan considered selective application of constitutional rules-
including newly-created ones-a departure from this obligation and a leg-
islative activity.23
Harlan's approach to habeas cases was also derived from his interpretation
of the function of judicial review. He reasoned that collateral attacks on
judgments were not within the scope of the Court's obligation to decide
actual cases and controversies. 24 Consequently, retroactivity was not consti-
tutionally mandated and other non-constitutional interests could be consid-
ered. He argued that generally the interests of society and the defendant
were both served by finality in criminal judgments. 25 Therefore, with limited
exceptions, Harlan favored non-retroactivity for cases on collateral review. 26
In Griffith v. Kentucky27 and Teague v. Lne,28 the Court accepted the
Harlan distinction between direct and collateral review as the primary means
for determining retroactivity. 29 In Griffith, the Court held that full retro-
21. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258.
22. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 678-79.
23. Id. at 679. Justice Harlan stated:
IT]he Court's assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases
before us [on direct review], is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional
function is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation. We apply and
definitively interpret the Constitution, under this view ... not because we are
bound to, but only because we occasionally deem it appropriate, useful, or wise.
Id.
Harlan also noted "unacceptable ancillary consequences" of denying retroactivity to defen-
dants on direct review. Id. at 681. In his view, prospective overruling cut the Court loose
from the stabilizing force of precedent and discouraged lower courts from attempting to
anticipate Supreme Court rulings, reducing them "largely to the role of automatons." Id. at
680-81. Finally, he argued that giving only the litigant in the rule-changing case the benefit of
the decision violated the constitutional requirement of treating similarly situated defendants
alike. Id. at 679; Desist, 394 U.S. at 258-59.
24. Desist, 394 U.S. at 260.
25. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679.
26. There were two exceptions. First, decisions which placed certain conduct "beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority" merited retroactive effect. Mackey, 401 U.S. at
692. The Teague plurality adopted this exception as part of its new retroactivity test. See infra
text accompanying notes 38-39. The second exception to the rule of finality was for "non-
observance of those procedures that ... are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The
Teague plurality also incorporated a modified form of this exception into its new retroactivity
test. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
27. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
28. 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989).
29. An appeal is collateral if it begins after the judgment becomes final. The Court has
defined a final judgment as one where "a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition
for certiorari finally denied." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n.6.
[Vol. 65:651
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activity is required for defendants on direct review.30 Conversely, in Teague,
the Court held that defendants on collateral review will receive the retroactive
benefit of new rules only in very unusual cases. 3'
Under Teague, retroactivity for habeas corpus cases is determined by a
two-step analysis. First, the court making the retroactivity decision must
decide if the rule in question is a new one, or merely an extension of old
precedent. If the rule is not new, then no retroactivity problem arises and
the court must apply the rule to the pending case. 32 Second, the court must
decide whether the new rule falls within one of the very narrow exceptions
created in Teague. Unless an exception applies, all new rules are non-
retroactive. 33
The Teague plurality adopted a very broad test for determining when a
rule is new. Under this test, "a case announces a new rule when it breaks
new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
government." ' 34 This occurs whenever "the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. '35
Under this expansive new rule definition, it is hard to imagine any rules of
criminal procedure that will not trigger retroactivity analysis.3 6 As Justice
Brennan noted in his Teague dissent, "[flew decisions on appeal or collateral
review are 'dictated' by what came before .... Virtually no case that
prompts a dissent on the relevant legal point, for example, could be said
to be 'dictated' by prior decisions. '37
30. Id. at 328.
31. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070.
32. Even prior to Teague, the Court consistently considered whether a rule was new before
applying retroactivity analysis. See, e.g., Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 215-18 (1988) (unani-
mous decision) (rule not new so no retroactivity problem).
33. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075.
34. Id. at 1070.
35. Id. (emphasis in original).
36. The Teague plurality's new rule analysis is much broader than the analysis proposed
by Justice Harlan. Justice Harlan recognized that the new rule distinction could be a difficult
one. Desist, 394 U,S. at 263; Mackey, 401 U.S. at 695. Consequently, he defined new rules
with reference to the purposes behind habeas corpus review. Because habeas serves as an
incentive for state court judges to adhere to existing constitutional norms, Justice Harlan felt
that a rule should not be considered "new" unless it could be said with assurance that the
Supreme Court would not have adopted the rule given the opportunity at the time the
defendant's case became final. Desist, 394 U.S. at 263-64. In making this decision, adherence
to precedent would not always be sufficient: "[Tihe doctrine of stare decisis cannot always be
a complete answer to the retroactivity problem if a habeas petitioner is really entitled to the
constitutional law which prevailed at the time of his conviction." Id. at 264. Rather, Harlan
acknowledged that when a rule had been questioned in subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
a later overruling of that case might not be considered a new rule. Id. at 264-65.
The Teague plurality departed from Harlan's analysis by adopting an expansive new rule
definition based on adherence to precedent. Although Harlan appeared to consider some
modifications in the law not "new rules," see Desist, 394 U.S. at 264-68, the Teague plurality
held that unless a rule is required by existing precedent, it will be considered new for retroactivity
purposes.
37. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1087-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). But see
1990]
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The Teague plurality created two exceptions to the rule of non-retroactivity
in habeas corpus cases. The first exception is for decisions which place
certain conduct "beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe. '38 This exception will apply when the Court has created a new
rule based on substantive due process grounds. 39 The second exception is
for new rules of criminal procedure which "implicate the fundamental
fairness of the trial." 4 A rule will fall within this exception only if it is
"accuracy-enhancing" such that "without [it] the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished. '41 The Teague plurality made it clear
that this exception will be met only in rare cases:
[W]e believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process
have yet to emerge. We are also of the view that such rules are "best
illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus-that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence;
that the prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony; or that
the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant
by brutal methods. 42
The retroactivity test created in Teague could virtually eliminate retroactive
rules from habeas corpus cases. Taken together, the broad new rule defi-
nition and the extremely limited exceptions to non-retroactivity will greatly
reduce the chances that defendants receive the benefit of new rules of
criminal procedure on habeas corpus review. However, the impact of Teague
will depend partially on how lower courts interpret it.
II. TEAGUE VS. LnKxLETTER: CHANGE FOR THE BETTER?
In Teague, the plurality attempted to end the long struggle with retro-
activity rules. However, the few cases which have followed Teague suggest
that it has by no means ended the retroactivity debate. Despite the fact that
the flexible Linkletter test has been replaced by the rule-bound Harlan
approach, definitional problems remain which will plague courts trying to
apply this test. These problems are inevitable given the nature of the current
retroactivity analysis.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (holding prompted vehement dissent, but rule still
not considered new), discussed infra text accompanying notes 65-90.
38. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part)).
39. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93. The Penry Court expanded this exception to include
"rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2953.
40. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076.
41. Id. at 1076-77.
42. Id. at 1077 (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
[Vol. 65:651
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A. The Problems with Categorical Analysis
Like its predecessor, Teague is a categorical balancing test. Under Teague
courts must treat similarly all defendants whose trials were tainted by the
same newly-recognized constitutional error. Therefore, each retroactivity
decision determines the rights of a whole class of defendants. This creates
a problem when the constitutional error had the potential of affecting the
accuracy of some, but not all, of the trials of those who will be bound by
the retroactivity ruling.
As Justice Harlan once noted, "a fundamental value determination of
our society [is] that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let
a guilty man go free." ' 43 Although Supreme Court Justices and scholars
continue to debate the purposes of the habeas corpus review,4 virtually all
agree that one of the central functions of habeas corpus review is to protect
innocent people from incarceration. 4
Despite the consensus that habeas corpus review should be used to ensure
that convictions are accurate, the Teague retroactivity test limits the ability
of lower courts to consider the impact of newly-recognized errors on the
accuracy of trials. Under Teague, courts are required to deny retroactive
43. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
44. For example, compare the majority and concurring opinions in Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365 (1986). For a comprehensive discussion of the different interpretations of the
purposes of habeas corpus review, see Peller, In Defense of Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16
H v. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 579 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1076 (1989) ("[O]ur cases have moved in
the direction of reaffirming the relevance of the likely accuracy of convictions in determining
the available scope of habeas review."); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (exception
to procedural default rules when defendant probably innocent); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 491 n.31 (1976):
Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no
innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results in serious
intrusions on values important to our system of government.... We nevertheless
afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing the need in a free society for an
additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconsti-
tutional loss of liberty.
Id.; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986) (plurality opinion):
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second chance to test the
fundamental justice of his incarceration. Even where, as here, ... many judges
... have determined that his trial was free from constitutional error, a prisoner
retains a powerful and legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody
if he is innocent of the charge for which he was incarcerated.
Id.
The dissenting Justices in Kuhlmann supported a broader conception of habeas corpus
review. Id. at 464-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This standard
incorporates concerns about inaccurate convictions. Id. at 471 n.5, 476.
For the seminal article arguing that a showing of innocence should be required before a
writ of habeas corpus is granted, see Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 142 (1970).
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effect to a new rule unless they find that the rule is a bedrock procedural
element which is "central to an accurate determination of innocence or
guilt.'"' However, many rules have multiple purposes and the effect of a
newly-recognized error on the accuracy of. the trial may.be a "question of
probabilities. ' '47 In these cases, Teague forces courts to choose between
complete retroactivity and non-retroactivity; there is no room for a selective
approach that would only benefit defendants whose trials were probably
inaccurate.
Given the fundamental concern for protecting the innocent, it is arguable
that complete retroactivity is mandated whenever there is doubt about the
accuracy of some trials where the newly-recognized constitutional .violation
occurred. However, the costs of complete retroactivity are high. In a recent
case- interpreting procedural, limits on habeas corpus litigation, 48 Justice
O'Connor noted that "the Great Writ entails significant costs." ' 49 These
include extending the ordeal of the trial for the accused and the society,50
and degrading the prominence of the trial by encouraging participants to
look to habeas proceedings to enforce procedural safeguards." In addition,
the lapse of time between a trial and the granting of the writ may cause
"erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses ... render[ing] retrial
difficult, even impossible. ' 52
The institutional concerns associated with writs of habeas corpus are
heightened in retroactivity cases. Finality concerns are strongly implicated;
retroactive application may affect defendants whose trials are long since
over.53 The impact of retroactive application is also much more disruptive
46. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1077.
47. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966). Difficulties determining the impact
of new procedural rules were encountered during the Linkletter era. As the Supreme Court
noted in one case, "Constitutional protections are frequently fashioned to serve multiple ends;
while a new standard may marginally implicate the reliability and integrity of the factfinding
process, it may have been designed primarily to foster other, equally fundamental values ......
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1980).
48. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
49. Id. at 126.
50. This frustrates the goals of deterrence and rehabilitation. Id. at 127 n.32.
51. Id. at 127.
52. Id. at 127-28.
53. Generally, defendants have the incentive to file a habeas corpus petition directly after
exhausting channels of direct review. However, a ruling that is available retroactively may
prompt filings years after a.conviction has become final.
Capital cases are an exception to the general practice of prompt filing of habeas petitions.
Defendants on death row are likely to wait until after the date of execution has been set
before filing a habeas petition. Their purpose in filing the petition is not to get out of jail
but to use the process to delay the execution. Therefore, the time differential between a normal
capital habeas petition and one spurred by a retroactive decision may be minimal, if not non-
existent. Also, unlike cases where the defendant is imprisoned for life, there is obviously an
outer limit on the filing of habeas petitions in death penalty cases (the date of the execution).
[Vol. 65:651
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than the occasional use of habeas corpus to enforce ignored constitutional
rights. In some cases retroactivity would overturn thousands of trials which
were valid under old precedent, 54 and public confidence in the criminal
justice system could deteriorate if the Court required such extensive retro-
activity.5 Finally, federalism concerns are compelling in this situation.
Reversal of convictions that were free from error at the time they became
final is a significant intrusion into state court autonomy.56
Although institutional concerns caution against extensive retroactivity,
some rights are sufficiently important to justify extending them to all cases
on habeas corpus review. For example, before Teague, the Supreme Court
retroactively applied decisions creating the right to counsel, 7 the right to
cross-examine a witness" and rulings establishing the state's burden of
proof.59 The decisions creating these rights merit complete retroactivity
because they involve procedures affecting the fairness and accuracy of all
trials. Presumably such fundamental rights would also be considered ret-
roactive under the accuracy-enhancing exception in Teague.
Unfortunately, many cases involve rules whose purposes and effects on
trials are not entirely clear. In these cases, balancing the interest in accuracy
against the interest in finality can be extremely difficult. By framing the
accuracy-enhancing exception very narrowly, the Teague plurality indicated
that the balance should almost always be struck in favor of finality.
However, this result will not always be consistent with notions of justice
and may lead to difficulties in application of the Teague test.
54. See, e.g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 634 (1968) (retroactivity could jeopardize
all convictions for serious crimes in certain states).
55. For an article deploring retroactive application of new rules because of the adverse
effects on society and consequent erosion of confidence in the criminal justice system, see
Nicholson, The SLA, Retroactive Court Decisions and Our Giant Judicial Junkyard, 54 CAL.
ST. B.J. 224 (1979).
56. One justification for habeas review is that it can be used to insure state compliance
with federal constitutional law. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977). However, this justification is not present in
retroactivity -cases. When a new rule is declared retroactive, reversal of state convictions is
mandated even though the trials were constitutional at the time they became final. In this
situation, state courts have committed no error that justifies the federal intrusion.
57. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (applying White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963) creating a right to assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing); McConnell v.
Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (applying Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) creating a right to
counsel at sentencing). Other right to counsel decisions were also applied retroactively, but
these were decided prior to Linkletter, so the balancing test was not applied. E.g., Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) (per curiam) (applying Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968)).
59. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) (retroactivity of Mullany v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975)); Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam)
(retroactivity of In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
1990]
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B. Application of Teague
Although the Teague retroactivity test advances institutional and feder-
alism interests, it fails to provide a mechanism for judges to respond to
accuracy concerns in individual cases. When the new rule does not fall
within Teague's narrow accuracy-enhancing exception, the constitutional
right does not extend to any cases within the category, even if the violation
has undermined the accuracy of individual trials. Because this anomalous
result fails to adequately protect defendants, it will tempt lower courts to
expand the Teague categories either to respond to a compelling claim of
innocence in the case before them or to prevent future claims from being
foreclosed by a non-retroactivity ruling. The pressures created by Teague's
failure to address accuracy concerns will be manifested in two places: in
new rule analysis, and in the accuracy-enhancing exception to non-retroac-
tivity.
1. New Rule Analysis
The new rule determination has plagued the Court for years. The Court
explicitly introduced this element into retroactivity analysis in 1969. 60 Before
applying the Linkletter test, the Court considered whether the rule was new
enough to trigger the retroactivity test. The Court concluded: "[h]owever
clearly our holding in [the rule-changing case] may have been foreshadowed,
it was a clear break with the past, and we are thus compelled to decide
[the retroactivity issue]. '"61 Subsequent cases suggested differing and often
inconsistent interpretations of the nature of this threshold inquiry,62 and
many prompted vehement disagreement among the Justices. 63
60. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
61. Id. at 248.
62. Compare Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459 (1979) (per curiam) (holding that no
retroactivity issue exists with respect to the application of Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
(1979) because it did not announce new standards not evident from previous decisions) with
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's retroactive application
of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) by focusing on the good faith
reliance of police officers but not addressing the existence of previous precedents) and United
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) (creating three categories of cases based on the relative
novelty of the precedent).
63. See, e.g., Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) (per curiam) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing that the new rule followed from old precedent); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638,
655-67 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that no retroactivity question exists because
decision based on principles previously announced by the Court); Milton v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371, 381 n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that no retroactivity issue arises
unless "the decision overrules clear past precedent, or disrupts a practice long accepted and
widely relied upon." (citations omitted)).
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With acceptance of the Harlan approach to retroactivity, new rule analysis
becomes even more important than it was under Linkletter.4 If the Harlan
exceptions are construed narrowly, finding that a rule is not new will be
the only plausible way to extend the recently established constitutional right
to habeas defendants. Thus, this already difficult threshold inquiry may
become a focal point of debate.
Under the Teague retroactivity analysis, any decision that is not dictated
by prior precedent is considered to have created a new rule. 65 Strictly
applied, this test would subject most newly-recognized constitutional rights
to retroactivity analysis. However, when judges are concerned that denial
of retroactivity may result in an inaccurate conviction being upheld, they
may manipulate the new rule analysis to avoid this harsh result.
The Court's surprising decision in Penry v. Lynaugh6 confirms this
prediction. Although decided only weeks after Teague, this case illustrates
a softening of Teague's rigid new rule analysis. Penry involved the consti-
tutionality of the Texas death penalty statute. Under the Texas statute,
juries are required to answer three questions during the death penalty stage
of trials.67 The questions relate to whether the crime was committed delib-
erately and without provocation, and whether the defendant is likely to be
a continuing threat to society. 68 An affirmative answer to all three questions
results in imposition of the death penalty. 69
In Jurek v. Texase0 the Supreme Court found the Texas death penalty
statute constitutional on its face. Although that case produced no majority
opinion, three Justices reasoned that the statute passed constitutional muster
because it channeled the jury's discretion through the use of the statutorily
mandated questions. 7' In reaching this conclusion, they relied on the state
appellate court's analysis:
64. But see United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549 (stating that under the Linkletter
test, if a rule of criminal procedure was "a clear break with the past" the Court would almost
invariably find that rule non-retroactive).
65. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
66. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
67. Id. at 2942.
68. Id. The three questions are:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 1989).
69. Id.
70. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
71. Id. at 276 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
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In determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continuing
threat to society, the jury could consider whether the defendant had a
significant criminal record. It could consider the range and severity of
his prior criminal conduct. It could further look to the age of the
defendant and whether . . . he was acting under duress ... [and]
consider whether the defendant was under an extreme form of mental
or emotional pressure ... 
Because lower courts had permitted juries to consider a broad range of
mitigating evidence, the plurality concluded that the statute did not uncon-
stitutionally limit the jury's sentencing discretion. 73
The petitioner in Penry, however, argued that the sentencing scheme
upheld in Jurek violated the eighth amendment when applied to his case.
Penry had a mental age of six and one-half years and suffered from an
organic brain disorder.74 He had been abused as a child and had been in
and out of state institutions from an early age. 7 Although the jury had
been instructed to consider this evidence, 76 Penry argued that the jury had
been unable to give effect to it when answering the special questions. He
argued that when defendants present mitigating evidence that has no rele-
vance to the statutory questions, the jury should be advised that they may
give effect to it in the sentencing proceedings. 7
In assessing Penry's claim, the Court first considered whether a holding
in favor of Penry would constitute a new rule. 71 Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, found that it would not.79 In reaching this conclusion, she
relied upon the plurality's statement in Jurek that "the constitutionality of
the Texas procedures turns on whether the enumerated questions allow
consideration of particularized mitigating factors." 80 O'Connor found that
72. Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
73. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 273-74.
74. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2941.
75. Id. at 2941-42.
76. Id. at 2943 ("The jurors were further instructed that in answering the three special
issues, they could consider all the evidence submitted in both the guilt or innocence phase and
the penalty phase of the trial.").
77. Id. at 2945.
78. Id. at 2944. Teague operates as a threshold inquiry. If the rule the Court is considering
would be a new. one, it cannot be recognized in a habeas corpus case because it would be
unavailable to all habeas petitioners (including the one before the Court)., This aspect of the
Teague holding was severely criticized by the Teague dissenters. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1084(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the plurality would for the first time preclude the federal courts
from considering on collateral review a vast range of important constitutional challenges");
id. at 1079 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the plurality inverts the proper order of adjudica-
tion").
79. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945. The four Teague dissenters, Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens, all concurred in Part II(B) of O'Connor's opinion in which she
determined that Penry was not seeking a new rule. Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 2963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272.
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this language implied that the state must direct the jury to consider all
mitigating evidence, including evidence unrelated to the questions." In
Penry's case, this obligation could only be met by giving special instructions
to the jury. Q'Connor concluded: "the relief Penry seeks does not 'impos[e]
a new obligation' on the State of Texas. Rather, Penry simply asks the
State to fulfill the assurance upon which Jurek was based ... -' "2
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissenters, accused the majority of only
paying "lip-service" to Teague."3 Scalia stated that "it challenges the imag-
ination to think that today's result is 'dictated' by our prior cases." 4
Instead, he argued that the most plausible interpretation of Jurek was that
it foreclosed Penry's claim." He based this conclusion on the fact that the
Jurek Court had approved the Texas statute because it directed the jury to
consider mitigating evidence in connection with the statutory questions. He
argued that the majority's reasoning "flatly contradicts that analysis,"' 6
because the majority was now holding "that the constitutionality turns on
whether the questions allow mitigating factors not only to be considered
(and, of course, given effect ... ) but also to be given effect in all possible
ways, including.., purposes not specifically permitted by the questions. "87
Scalia concluded that the majority's application of the new rule analysis
rendered Teague meaningless:
In a system based on precedent ... it is the tradition to find each
decision "inherent" in earlier cases (however well concealed its presence
might have been) .... If Teague does not apply to a claimed "inher-
ency" as vague and debatable as that in the present case, then it applies
only to habeas requests for plain overruling-which means that it adds
little if anything to the principles already in place concerning the
retroactivity of new rules in criminal cases .
The debate between the majority and the dissent illustrates problems
inherent in the new rule analysis. Both sides fairly point to aspects of earlier
opinions which appear either to foreclose or support Penry's claim. In the
end, Justice Scalia has the better of the arguments: by recognizing a rule
81. Justice O'Connor supported her argument that this was not a new obligation by
referring to other cases in which the Court had held that the state may not instruct the jury
not to consider mitigating evidence. For this proposition she cited Lockett'v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (state may not preclude jury from considering mitigating evidence)
and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (judge may not prohibit jury from considering
mitigating evidence).
82. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2945 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 2964 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's dissent was joined by the two other Justices
WYho had joined O'Connor's plurality opinion in Teague.
84. Id. at 2965.
85. Id. at 2966-67.
86. Id. at 2966.
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 2965.
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that was at most implied by previous cases, the Penry majority retreated
from the extremely expansive new rule analysis established in Teague.
In future cases the Supreme Court will undoubtedly try to clarify this
issue. However, the conflict between Teague and Penry demonstrates that
new rule analysis is a gray area, subject to continual manipulation. The
Court has not managed to end the new rule controversy; the determination
is as difficult as it was during the Linkletter era. In fact the situation is
worse than before. Under the stringent retroactivity test created by Teague,
courts have limited opportunity to give weight to concerns that a conviction
has been inaccurate. In cases similar to Penry, new rule analysis may be
twisted to give the benefit of a rule of criminal procedure to a defendant
who clearly deserves it. 9
Indeed, O'Connor's liberal interpretation of Teague's new rule test may
have stemmed from her concern about the accuracy of this particular
sentencing. As one lower court noted: "O'Connor's application ... of
Teague's 'new rule' formula may well have turned upon facts which she
thought unique to Penry's claims."' 9 However, as will be discussed below,
the new rule analysis is not the only mechanism for judges to vindicate
concerns about individual injustices. Considerable room for judicial disa-
greement also remains in the construction of the retroactivity exceptions.
2. The Accuracy-enhancing Exception to Non-retroactivity
The Teague exception to non-retroactivity for accuracy-enhancing proce-
dural rules will likely be the subject of some controversy.9' In Teague itself,
there were disagreements over both the wording and application of the
test.92 If this exception becomes another means by which judges accom-
modate accuracy concerns, it is likely that it will be construed broadly. If
this occurs, the institutional problems of extensive retroactivity will reappear
as entire categories of defendants gain the benefit of new rules.
89. It is not clear that Penry's claim, had it been found a "new" one, would have fallen
within one of the narrow exceptions to retroactivity. Clearly, the four dissenters, who did not
support recognizing the claim at all, would not have found it to be a "bedrock procedural
element" without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction was severely diminished. In
Penry's case, denying retroactivity would have amounted to letting the death penalty stand,
which seems a particularly harsh result on the basis of retroactivity principles.
90. Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1288 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Sawyer
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 835 (1990).
91. It is unlikely that there will be significant disagreement over whether a rule falls within
the substantive due process exception. In Penry, the otherwise sharply divided court unani-
mously agreed on application of this test. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952-53.
92. See Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1080-81 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with both the
wording of the test and the application of it); id. at 1084, 1092 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(against adopting a new test but also arguing that under the plurality's test the petitioner's
claim fell within an exception).
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Lower courts have already begun to debate the scope of the accuracy-
enhancing exception. In 1985, the Supreme Court created a new rule of
criminal procedure to govern the sentencing phase of capital trials. In
Caldwell v. Mississippi,93 the Court ruled that the prosecutor may not refer
to appellate review of the jury's sentencing decision unless this reference is
accompanied by "a full description of the appellate process" 94 or instructions
which prevent the jury from being misled. 95 The purpose of this rule is to
insure that capital juries understand that they bear full responsibility for
deciding the fate of the criminal defendant. 96
The Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have considered the retroactivity
of Caldwell and have arrived at divergent conclusions. 97 Both courts agree
that Caldwell constitutes a new rule under the Teague threshold inquiry. 98
However, unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that
Caldwell falls within the accuracy-enhancing exception to non-retroactivity.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority admitted that a rule regulating
reference to appellate process does not seem to qualify as a bedrock
procedural rule under Teague.99 However, the court concluded that because
the Caldwell rule insures that juries understand "[their] core function in a
capital sentencing hearing"'10 it is "fundamentally related to the accuracy
of a death sentence." 10'
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. After an extensive discussion of Teague, the
court concluded that Caldwell was not sufficiently fundamental to merit
retroactive effect. The court noted:
[The petitioner] can argue at most that there would be a possibility,
absent the alleged Caldwell violation, of a different outcome to the
jury's sentencing procedure. Yet... the Court's Teague opinion makes
quite clear that not every procedural rule affecting the accuracy of a
trial will fit within the [exception] .... Instead, the examples listed by
the Teague Court-trial by mob rule, use of perjured testimony, or the
extraction of confessions through brutal torture-either so distort the
judicial process as to leave one with the impression that there has been
no judicial determination at all, or else skew the actual evidence crucial
to the trier of fact's disposition of the case.-°
93. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
94. Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Caldwell).
95. Id. at 1291-92.
96. The Court noted that the premise of capital sentencing schemes is that "jurors
confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will
act with due regard for the consequences .... ." Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329-30 (citing McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971)).
97. See Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1273; Hopkinson, 888 F.2d at 1286.
98. Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1287-91; Hopkinson, 888 F.2d at 1291.
99. Hopkinson, 888 F.2d at 1291-92.
100. Id. at 1292.
101. Id.
102. Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1294 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, the court concluded that although the Caldwell violation could
have implicated the accuracy of some sentencing decisions, it could not be
given retroactive effect under Teague.l03
A recent Supreme Court decision in a related context supports the Fifth
Circuit's decision not to apply Caldwell retroactively.'04 In Dugger v. Ad-
ams, 105 the Court considered whether a Caldwell violation is so fundamental
that it should be automatically available to defendants, even if they have
not properly preserved the issue for appeal.' 6 The Court held that it is not,
stating that although a Caldwell violation is "the kind of error that might
have affected the accuracy of a death sentence"'' 7 this does not mean that
any one individual sentenced in violation of Caldwell "probably is 'actually
innocent' of the sentence he or she received."'' 8 This language implies that
the Supreme Court would not find Caldwell "so central to an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt"1°9 that it merits retroactive effect under
Teague.
Although it appears that the Tenth Circuit has misinterpreted Teague,
the decision is nonetheless justified. A violation of Ca/dwell clearly has a
possible impact on the reliability of the sentencing decision. This was the
basis for the decision." 0 The Tenth Circuit's decision to apply Caldwell
retroactively is the only way the court could insure that the rule would be
available in cases where the violation had seriously undermined the accuracy
of a sentence. Because the Teague categorical test forced the Tenth Circuit
into an all-or-nothing choice, the court interpreted the accuracy-enhancing
exception broadly to guard against future inaccurate sentences."'
The circuit split over Caldwell is the first retroactivity disagreement since
Teague was decided. However, because the stakes are so high, it is likely
that courts will continue to debate over the content of the accuracy-
enhancing exception to Teague. Courts will either undermine finality con-
cerns by applying the Teague exception broadly, or fail to protect individual
defendants by honoring the language and spirit of the Teague decision. 2
103. Id.
104. This case was cited by the Fifth Circuit as one basis for its holding. Id. at 1293.
105. 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
106. The issue was procedurally defaulted. For a description of the procedural default rules,
see infra text accompanying notes 121-31.
107. Dugger, 109 S. Ct. at 1218 n.6.
108. Id.
109. Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1077.
110. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 340.
111. The majority was not worried about the case before them, which they concluded had
not been affected by the error. Hopkinson, 888 F.2d at 1296-97. However, they were clearly
concerned about other cases in which the error might have been more serious. Id. at 1293.
112. See Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1290 (stating that the court should honor the spirit and




The categorical retroactivity test created by the plurality in Teague will
be difficult to apply and will lead to inconsistent results. The test also
violates notions of fairness by foreclosing consideration of constitutional
claims even in cases where verdicts were probably inaccurate. Because the
competing interests in finality and accuracy are both so fundamental, the
retroactivity problem cannot be completely resolved by a categorical test."3
Instead, in most cases an individualized approach will better accommodate
the competing interests.
The categorical accuracy-enhancing exception created by Teague is appro-
priate for unusually important new rulings. When the Supreme Court
recognizes a new constitutional violation that has undermined the accuracy
of most of the trials involving it, the accuracy-enhancing exception should
be applied to the entire category of affected cases. The substantial societal
costs of complete retroactivity justify keeping this exception narrow." 4 As
Justice O'Connor admonished in Teague, "it is unlikely that many such
components of due process have yet to emerge.""' 5
However, to prevent unjust incarcerations, the extremely narrow accuracy-
enhancing exception to non-retroactivity should be supplemented by a new
exception for individual cases. An exception to the Teague retroactivity test
should be available to any defendant able to show that: 1) a violation of a
new rule of criminal procedure occurred in his case that would be grounds
for reversal had the case been on direct review, and 2) the violation probably
caused his trial to yield an incorrect verdict. To satisfy the second require-
ment the defendant could rely on the record of the case or on newly
obtained evidence, but in either case would have to raise a significant
question" 6 as to the accuracy of the trial.
There are several advantages to adopting this new retroactivity exception.
These advantages include striking the appropriate balance between fairness
and finality, preserving the integrity of Teague and conforming retroactivity
analysis to an analogous habeas corpus doctrine.
113. Nor is the problem likely to go away. The Supreme Court continues to recognize
important new rules of criminal procedure, especially in the area of death penalty cases. As
one court notes:
During [a] ten year period ending with the final day of the Supreme Court's
1988 term, it granted plenary review in sixty-seven cases and at least thirty-five
of those can, with little dissent, be described as presenting issues of substantial
reach. The destabilizing impact of such a sea-change in controlling law presents
problems of administration unique to death cases.
Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1289 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Sawyer v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 835 (1990).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
115. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1077 (1989).
116. This determination would be within the discretion of the district court. Reversal would
be required if the court found it more likely than not that the trial was inaccurate.
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A. Balance of Fairness and Finality
The individualized exception to non-retroactivity would preserve the im-
portant innocence-screening function of habeas corpus while minimizing the
costs of this type of review. In Teague and Linkletter, the Court rejected
case-by-case retroactivity analysis in favor of a categorical approach based
on the type of rule created. These categorical approaches run the risk of
casting too wide a net-or one not wide enough. In the former case,
defendants whose trials were fair and accurate receive new trials. This result
should be avoided because of the significant costs of this type of habeas
review. In the latter case potentially innocent defendants are denied review
because most similarly situated defendants received accurate verdicts. This
conflicts with the concern for protecting the innocent that is at the heart
of our criminal justice system.
The innocence-oriented exception to non-retroactivity coupled with the
Teague test avoids problems of underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness.
Limiting the categorical accuracy-enhancing exception to bedrock procedural
rules advances the strong societal interest in finality of criminal verdicts.
However, the exception for actual innocence allows courts to honor the
fundamental policy that habeas corpus review should be used to reverse
inaccurate convictions.
B. Preserving the Integrity of Teague
In the twenty-five years since Linkletter was decided, the Court has
handed down a series of controversial retroactivity rulings. These rulings
have generated a barrage of academic criticism'17 and have divided the
Court, provoking vehement dissents from a number of Justices."' In ad-
dition, retroactivity cases have consumed a significant amount of the Court's
117. See, e.g., Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61
N.C.L. REv. 745 (1983); Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought" A Call for the End
of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. Camx. L., CRIMNOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 417 (1969); Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HAv.
L. REv. 56 (1965); Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 1
(1982). The Teague plurality also commented on the lack of popularity of its previous
retroactivity decisions: "Not surprisingly, commentators have 'had a veritable field day' with
the Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being 'more than mildly negative."'
Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1071 (quoting Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and
a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REv. 1557, 1558 & n.3 (1975)).
118. The sharp division in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), is an example of the
disputed nature of the retroactivity cases. See supra text accompanying notes 66-89. Moreover,
over the years retroactivity cases have often been decided by plurality opinions. See, e.g.,
Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Gosa v. Mayden, 413
U.S. 665 (1973); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972).
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limited time-since 1965 as many as six cases per year have been devoted
to retroactivity analysis." 9
The time has come for the Court to end the retroactivity debate. However,
the current categorical approach will not permit this. Concerns about
accuracy in individual cases will pressure lower courts to twist the Teague
analysis. As a result, courts will continually disagree about the meaning and
content of the new rule inquiry and the exceptions to non-retroactivity. The
Supreme Court will again be faced with a plethora of inconsistent lower
court opinions and will be required to intervene to settle the controversy.
After years of disagreement, the Supreme Court has finally developed a
theoretically sound test for dealing with retroactivity problems. 120 However,
an exception is needed to preserve the integrity of the new approach. The
proposed exception would serve this function by alleviating the pressure on
lower courts to expand the Teague categories. It would also shift much of
the decisionmaking in retroactivity cases from the Supreme Court to the
lower federal courts. This would result in an efficient use of judicial
resources. Since district courts already have the primary responsibility for
overseeing habeas corpus cases and can respond to the evidence of each
individual case, they can best resolve the merits of retroactivity disputes.
C. Congruence with Other Habeas Doctrines
The suggested approach to retroactivity parallels the analysis used in
procedural default cases, another area of habeas corpus litigation. There
are three advantages to using similar tests to resolve both issues. First,
consistency between the two approaches is theoretically sound because both
doctrines have been created to address the same concerns. Second, similarity
between the two will aid lower courts applying the new exception. Finally,
unification of the approaches will simplify some cases which raise both
issues. These benefits will be discussed after an analysis of the current
procedural default rules.
1. Procedural Default Rules
In most states, defendants waive their rights to appeal any issue they fail
to raise at trial. However, the defendant may still raise the defaulted issue
119. In 1969, the Court decided six cases primarily or partially on the basis of retroactivity
issues: DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969), Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969),
Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969), Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969),
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) and Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969).
Other big years for retroactivity analysis were 1968 (five cases), 1971 and 1973 (three cases)
and 1974 (four cases).
120. The Teague test is based largely on Justice Harlan's analysis. Both tests are premised
on a model of judicial review which justifies distinguishing between direct review and collateral
attacks on judgments. See supra text accompanying notes 20-31.
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in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, because federal courts are not
bound by state procedure. In order to avoid continual litigation of claims
that should have been raised at trial, the Supreme Court has developed a
set of rules dealing with procedural default. Generally, a defendant will be
barred from raising a defaulted issue unless there is both cause for the
default and prejudice arising from it.121 Cause for the default exists if the
defendant's lawyer is incompetent,122 or if the issue was so novel at the
time of the trial that the lawyer had no reasonable legal basis for raising
it.123
Despite these rules, the Court has stated that lower courts can waive the
cause requirement 24 in appropriate cases. In Murray v. Carrier,'2 the Court
confronted the issue of whether mistakes by counsel which did not meet
the constitutional test for incompetence could provide cause for procedural
default. 26 This case involved a lawyer's inadvertent omission of an issue
from his appellate brief. 27 After deciding that procedural default rules
applied to the appellate process, 2s the majority held that the error did not
constitute cause for the default., In doing so, they rejected the argument
that procedural default rules should be framed with reference to the char-
acter of the constitutional claim being asserted. 29 However, the Court
explicitly retained an exception geared towards individual injustices:
We remain confident that, for the most part, "victims of a fundamental
miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard." But
we do not pretend that this will always be true. Accordingly, we think
that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing
of cause for the procedural default.3u
The case was remanded to determine whether the defaulted issue was one
which could establish the defendant's actual innocence. 31
121. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
122, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). If incompetence of counsel is the reason
for the default, the exhaustion doctrine requires the issue to first be raised in state court. Id.
at 488-89.
123. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
124. If the defendant is unable to show cause, then the prejudice prong of the inquiry is
generally irrelevant. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87 (requiring both elements).
125. 477 U.S. at 478.
126. The defaulted claim was a trial court's denial of discovery of a victim's statements
prior to the trial.
127. Id. at 481-82.
128. Id. at 492.
129. Id. at 493. The Court was discussing Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, id. at 497-
516.
130. Id. at 495-96 (citations omitted).
131. .Id. The Supreme Court also recognized the possibility of an individual-not categori-
cal-exception to procedural default rules in Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989).
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2. The New Retroactivity Exception
The proposed exception to Teague would bring retroactivity analysis in
line with the current procedural default test. In both retroactivity and
procedural default, the Supreme Court has created a general test to deter-
mine when an issue that was not litigated in state court can be raised in a
petition for habeas corpus. However, the Supreme Court has created an
exception to the procedural default rules when necessary to prevent a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice.' ' 32 Permitting a similar exception in
the context of retroactivity would eliminate the discrepancy between these
otherwise similar doctrines.
Consistency between procedural default and retroactivity rules has both
theoretical and practical appeal. It is theoretically sound for these doctrines
to be similar, because they serve the same interests. As one circuit court
has noted:
Similar concerns underlie both the procedural default doctrine and the
Teague doctrine prohibiting reliance on new rules. Both doctrines rec-
ognize the importance of finality in criminal convictions. Both doctrines
promote federal-state comity by requiring federal courts to defer to the
integrity of state convictions. And both doctrines put a premium upon
the obligation of defendants to raise all relevant arguments before their
convictions become final.' 33
Congruence among these doctrines demonstrates that the Court is making
principled, reasoned decisions and tends to rebut claims that the Court is
influenced by ideological considerations.
Creating a new retroactivity exception would not require the creation of
a new doctrine. The proposed exception is identical to the one used in
procedural default cases. In both situations the lower court must assess the
constitutional claim being asserted and overturn convictions based on that
claim only when there is some question about the accuracy of the trial.
Therefore, if the proposed exception is adopted, lower courts would not
have to grapple with new legal doctrine, but simply extend the established
Murray v. Carrier exception to a new context.
Unification of the approaches will also simplify cases which raise both
issues. The Court has already twice dealt with the problem of procedural
default in the context of retroactively applied decisions. 34 This is likely to
be a recurring issue because in many cases a retroactive ruling will affect
an issue not raised at trial.
Under current analysis, when an issue controlled by a new Supreme Court
ruling has been procedurally defaulted, courts must apply the retroactivity
132. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495.
133. Sawyer, 881 F.2d at 1293.
134. Reed, 468 U.S. at 1; Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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test and the procedural default test. Of course, if a rule is found non-
retroactive, then the procedural default issue in that case is irrelevant because
the retroactivity ruling already bars the claim. However, when Teague
categories are construed broadly to extend retroactivity to entire categories
of rules, courts must apply the complicated procedural default analysis to
the retroactively-recognized issue. If the court finds that the procedural
default test has not been met, the court must finally consider whether the
"miscarriage of justice" exception should be applied in the case.
Adopting the proposed retroactivity exception would vastly simplify tihis
process. The individual exception to non-retroactivity would eliminate the
pressure on courts to expand the Teague categories. Instead, most retroac-
tivity decisions would be made on an individual basis. In these cases, the
need for procedural default analysis would be eliminated. If a defendant
makes a showing of innocence adequate to retroactively receive the benefit
of a new rule, he has necessarily met the standard for receiving the Murray
v. Carrier exception. Therefore, the combined retroactivity and procedural
default analysis would be completed with one inquiry.
CONCLUSION
The suggested innocence-oriented exception to the Teague analysis would
solve a number of problems. First, this exception would not be categorical.
Any individual would be entitled to the retroactive benefit of a new rule if
the rule affected the accuracy of his trial. Under this approach courts could
successfully balance the need for finality with the concern for fairness.
Second, the exception would preserve the integrity of Teague. Under Teague,
courts are free, in exceptional circumstances, to require complete retroac-
tivity if a new constitutional rule is integral to the fairness of all trials.
However, unless the Court permits an exception for probable innocence,
new rule analysis and the limited accuracy-enhancing exception will be
expanded to accommodate concerns about accuracy in individual cases. The
proposed exception will prevent such a costly expansion. Finally, the addition
of -an exception to the Teague test would not require the development of a
whole new body of law to determine retroactivity. The proposed exception
mirrors the current approach to procedural default and in fact would
simplify some cases that raise both issues.
In Desist v. United States,135 Justice Harlan laid down a challenge to the
Court. Troubled by the post-Linkletter confusion, he declared 'Retro-
activity' must be rethought."' 36 In Griffith v. Kentucky and Teague v. Lane
the Supreme Court began the needed overhaul of retroactivity analysis.
However, the Court's work has not yet been completed.
135. 394 U.S. at 244.




As this Note was going to press, the Supreme Court handed down two
new retroactivity decisions. In Butler v. McKellar137 and Saffle v. Parks,138
the Court declined to apply newly-recognized constitutional rules retroac-
tively to habeas cases. In both cases, the Court used an extremely expansive
new rule analysis to justify its decisions. Thus, the Court has made it clear
that the more flexible new rule analysis used in Penry will be limited to the
facts of that case.
In Butler, the Court considered whether the rule created by Arizona v.
Roberson, 39 should be considered new for the purposes of the retroactivity
inquiry. In Roberson, the Court held that when a suspect in custody is
being interrogated about two different crimes, request for counsel in con-
nection with one crime also bars interrogation in connection with the second
crime. The Court stated that the result was required by a previous fifth
amendment case, Edwards v. Arizona. 40 The petitioner in Butler relied on
the majority's analysis in Roberson to argue that Roberson did not create
a new rule, but merely followed from Edwards.
In Butler, five members of the Court rejected this claim. Instead, the
majority held that a rule would be considered new as long as reasonable
judges could have concluded that the rule was not required by precedent
existing at the time the petitioner's conviction became final. The Court
stated:
The "new rule" principle therefore validates reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though
they are shown to be contrary to later decisions....
... mhe fact that a court says that its decision is within the "logical
compass" of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is "controlled" by a
prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of deciding whether the
current decision is a "new rule" under Teague.1'4
The Court concluded that the outcome in Roberson was "susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds," and therefore created a new rule. This
expansive new rule analysis was followed, without significant modification,
in Saffle v. Parks.
In addition to broadening new rule analysis, the Court will soon address
the scope of the accuracy-enhancing exception to Teague. On January 16,
137. No. 88-6677 (U.S. March 5, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. file).
138. No. 88-1264 (U.S. March 5, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, U.S. file).
139. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
140. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Roberson, the Court stated: "Arizona asks us to craft an
exception to [Edwards] .... ." Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677 (emphasis added).




1990 the Court granted certiorari to Sawyer v. Butler,142 the Fifth Circuit
case that discusses the retroactivity of Caldwell v. Mississippi. 43 The Justices
may use this new case to resolve the circuit split over the retroactivity of
Caldwell.'44 The Court will probably reverse the Tenth Circuit's liberal
interpretation of Teague's accuracy-enhancing exception to non-retro-
activity. 4
These recent cases indicate that the Supreme Court intends to strictly
enforce Teague, and reverse any lower court attempts to modify the stringent
test. If this occurs, the institutional problems of extensive retroactivity
discussed earlier in this Note may be reduced. However, there will still be
a pressing need for an individual exception to non-retroactivity. The primary
rationale for permitting this exception is to enable a prisoner to gain the
benefit of a new rule when the constitutional violation undermined the
accuracy of his trial. As the Supreme Court expands the parameters of non-
retroactivity, the chances increase that a wrongly-convicted prisoner will be
denied the benefit of an important constitutional rule. The Court should
not lose sight of the central function of habeas corpus review-reversing
inaccurate convictions-as they continue to reduce the availability of new
rules of criminal procedure to defendants on habeas corpus review.
142. 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. granted sub nom. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
835 (1990).
143. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
144. See discussion supra notes 93-111.
145. If the Court permits the expansive interpretation of the accuracy-enhancing exception,
it will increase the institutional problems of retroactivity. As argued earlier, accuracy concerns
are better accommodated on a case-by-case basis than by a categorical exception. See supra
notes 43-60, 117 and accompanying text.
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